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Figures1. INTRODUCTION
The degree of  integration of financial markets around the  world increased
significantly  during  the late 1980s  and 1990s.  A key  factor underlying  this process  has
been the increased  globalization  of investments  seeking  higher  rates of return  and the
opportunity  to diversify risk internationally. At the same time, many countries  have
encouraged  inflows  of capital  by dismantling  restrictions,  deregulating  domestic  financial
markets, and  improving their  economic environment  and  prospects through the
introduction  of market-oriented  reforms.  In particular,  many developing  and transition
economies  in East  Asia, Latin  America,  and Eastern  Europe  have removed  restrictions
on  international  financial transactions,  at the  same time that they were relaxing
regulations  on the operation  of domestic  financial markets and moving away from
regimes  of financial  repression.  Policies  aimed  at increasing  the openness  of domestic
financial  markets  to foreign  investors  have  included  the removal  of controls  on capital
outflows  and  the liberalization  of restrictions  on foreign  direct investment.
The increase  in the degree of integration  of world capital markets has been
accompanied  by a significant  increase  in private  capital  flows to developing  countries.
As shown  in Figure  1, foreign  direct investment  flows and portfolio  flows (which  consist
of equities,  bonds,  and certificates  of deposit)  to developing  countries  started  growing  in
the 1980s  but expanded  at an accelerated  rate after 1990, until the late 1990s  for the
former  component  and until  the mid-1990s  for the latter.  This pattern  reflected  to a large
extent  the increased  incidence  of financial  volatility  and currency  crises in the second
half of the 1990s,  as discussed  below.  At the same  time, bank-intermediated  flows fell
significantly  in proportion  of total  flows.' Short-term,  cross-border  capital  flows  have  also
become more responsive  to  changes in  relative rates of  return, as  a  result of
technological  advances  and increased  linkages  among  capital  markets.
'  In addition  to the growing  trend toward integration  of world capital markets  and changes  in
policies  and prospects  in the recipient  countries,  global  cyclical  factors (such as the drop in short-term
interest  rates  in industrial  countries  in the early 1990s)  also played  an important  role in explaining  the
3Financial  openness  is often regarded  as providing  important  potential  benefits.
Access to world capital  markets,  as noted  earlier, expands  investors'  opportunities  for
portfolio  diversification  and provides  a potential  for achieving  higher  risk-adjusted  rates
of return. From the point of view of the recipient  country,  there are potentially  large
benefits as well. It has been argued that access to world capital markets allows
countries  to borrow  to smooth  consumption  in the face of adverse  shocks,  and  that the
potential  growth  and welfare  gains  resulting  from  such international  risk sharing  can be
large  (Obstfeld  (1994)).  At the same  time,  however,  it has been recognized  that the risk
of volatility  and abrupt reversals  in capital  flows in the context  of highly open capital
account  may  represent  a significant  cost.  Concerns  associated  with such reversals  were
heightened  by a series  of recent  financial  crises--including  the Mexican  pesc crisis of
December  1994,  the Asian  crisis  triggered  by the collapse  of the  Thai baht in July  1997,
the Russia  crisis  of August  1998,  and  the collapse  of the Brazilian  real in January  1999.
In fact, both domestic  and international  financial liberalization  appear to have been
associated  with  costly  financial  crises,  as documented  by Williamson  and Mahar  (1998).
Although  misaligned  fundamentals  of some  sort played  a role in all of the above  crises,
they have called attention  to the inherent  instability  of financial  markets  and the risks
that cross-border  financial transactions  can pose for countries  with relatively  fragile
financial  systems  and weak  regulatory  and supervision  structures.
In that perspective,  a key issue  has been to identify  the policy  prerequisites  that
may allow countries  to exploit the gains, while minimizing  the risks, associated  with
financial  openness.  The purpose  of this paper is to provide  a selective  and synoptic
view of the recent analytical  and empirical  literature on the benefits and costs of
international  financial  integration,  and  to identify  some key  policy  lessons  for small  open
economies,  particularly  those that are pondering  their options before embarking  in
programs  aimed  at increasing  financial  openness. 2 It is organized  as follows. Section  II
surge in capital flows. See Agenor (2000, Chapter 6) for a review of the evidence on "push'  and 'pull"
factors in the determination of the surge in capital flows during the 1990s.
2 See Yusuf (2001) for a recent discussion of other aspects of globalization, such as trade and
international  public goods.
4reviews analytical  arguments  related to the benefits  and costs of integration,  with
particular  attention  paid to the determinants  of capital  flows  to small  countries  and the
role of foreign bank penetration.  Section  III provides  an assessment  of the empirical
evidence  on the benefits  and costs  of financial  integration,  highlighting  in the process
areas in which this evidence  appears  to lack robustness. Section  IV concludes  and
draws  together  some  of the policy  implications  of the analysis.
1.  BENEFITS  AND  COSTS  OF INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION:  THEORY
The benefits  and costs  of financial  integration  can be viewed  either  from  the point
of view  of individual  investors  (such  as, for instance,  the opportunity  for international  risk
diversification,  as indicated  earlier)  or from the point of view of the countries  initiating
the process of integration.  This paper focuses solely on the second perspective,
ignoring  in the process  issues  such as the home-bias  puzzle  in the behavior  of private
capital  flows  (see  Obsffeld  (1998)  and Stultz  (1999)).  It begins  by reviewing  the potential
benefits  of financial  openness  and then  reviews  its potential  costs.
1.  Potential Benefits
Analytical arguments  supporting  financial openness  (or, equivalently,  an open
capital account)  revolve  around  four main considerations:  the benefits  of international
risk  sharing  for consumption  smoothing;  the positive  impact  of capital  flows  on domestic
investment  and growth;  enhanced  macroeconomic  discipline;  and increased  efficiency,
as well as greater stability,  of the domestic  financial system  associated  with foreign
bank  penetration.
5a. Consumption  Smoothing
Access to world capital markets may allow a country to engage in corsumption
smoothing, by allowing the country to borrow in "bad" times (say, during a recession or
a sharp deterioration in the country's terms of trade) and lend in "good" times (say, in an
expansion or following an improvement in the country's terms of trade).  By enabling
domestic households to  smooth out their consumption over time,  capital flows can
therefore increase welfare. This "counter-cyclical"  role of world capital markets allows
international  risk sharing and is fully justified if shocks are temporary in nature.
b. Domestic  Investment  and Growth
The ability to draw upon the international  pool of resources that financial openness
gives access to may also affect domestic investment and growth. In many developing
countries, the capacity to save is constrained by a low level of income. As long as the
marginal return from  investment is at  least equal to the  cost of  capital,  net foreign
resource inflows can supplement domestic saving, increase levels of physical capital
per worker, and help the recipient country raise its rate of economic growth and improve
living standards. 3 These potential benefits can be particularly large for some types of
capital inflows, most notably foreign direct investment (FDI).
In addition to this direct effect on growth, FDI may also have significant indirect
long-run effects. As emphasized early on by MacDougall (1960), and more recently by
Berthelemy and  Demurger (2000),  Borensztein, De Gregorio,  and  Lee  (1998), and
3 In general, foreign resource inflows can be viewed as an  income transfer that can  be either
consumed or invested. In Obstfeld's (1999) model, for instance, a foreign resource inflow is no different
from  any  other  increase in  income.  Unless the  rate of  intertemporal substitution is  very  high,  the
representative agent will  respond to  a  permanent resource inflow with  an  increase in consumption.
Because the inflow affects income as well as consumption,  saving may rise or fall. If the resource transfer
is temporary or takes  the form  of a  loan that  must be repaid, the consumption effect is somewhat
damped, but it is still likely to exceed the effect on investment. Thus, resource inflows may ra se utility by
allowing households to smooth consumption rather than by leading to a rise in investment and growth.
However, it should be  noted that this type of utility-based models misses some essentiall features of
foreign capital inflows. In particular, the assumption of a single representative  agent assumes a degree of
capital market development--equalization of lending and borrowing rates--that does not exist in  most
developing  countries.
6Grossman and  Helpman (1991), FDI may facilitate the transfer or  diffusion of
managerial  and technological  know-how--particularly  in the form of new varieties  of
capital inputs--and  improve  the skills composition  of the labor force as a  result of
"learning  by doing"  effects, investment  in formal  education,  and on-the-job  training.  In
addition,  as suggested  by Markusen  and Venables (1999), although the increased
degree  of competition  in the product  and factor markets  induced  by FDI may tend to
reduce  profits  of local  firms, spillover  effects  through  linkages  to supplier  industries  may
reduce  input  costs,  raise  profits,  and  stimulate  domestic  investment.
To highlight  the complementarity  (through  productivity  effects) between  FDI and
skilled human capital in the growth process consider, following Borensztein,  De
Gregorio,  and Lee (1998),  an economy  in which  the source  of technological  progress  is
an increase  in the number  of varieties  of capital  goods available  to producers,  which
consist  of local and foreign  firms. Suppose  also that the economy  produces  a single
final consumption  good using  the following  technology:
Y = SaK 1-a,
where  0 < a < 1 and S is the economy's  endowment  of skilled labor (assumed  given)
and K is the stock of physical capital,  which is itself a composite  of a continuum  of
different  varieties  of capital  goods,  each  one denoted  by x(l):
K = [ f  [x0) 1 9  dJJ1/ 1 1 x,
with N denoting  the total number  of varieties.  Physical  capital  accumulation  therefore
takes place  through  an increase  in the number  of varieties  of capital  goods produced
domestically.
Suppose  that there are two types of firms producing  capital goods:  foreign  firms,
which produce n* < N varieties, and domestic firms, which produce the other N - n*
7varieties.  Specialized  firms produce each  variety  j of capital goods and rent it out to
producers  of final goods  at a rate m(/).  The optimal  demand  for each variety  j  is thus
determined  by  equating the rental rate and the marginal productivity of j  in the
production  of the  final  good:
mU)  = (1 - c)SX-a  (1)
An increase  in the number  of varieties  of capital  goods  available  to producers  is
assumed  to require  the adaptation  of technology  available  in more  advanced  countries,
This adaptation  to local needs is assumed  to require  a fixed setup cost, F, which is
assumed  to depend  negatively  on the ratio  of foreign  firms  operating  domestically  to the
total number  of firms, n*/N. Thus,  F = F(n*lN),  with F  <  0.4  This assumption  captures
the idea that foreign firms make it easier to adopt the more advanced  technology
required  to produce new varieties  of capital,  by bringing  in the "knowledge'  already
available  elsewhere.
In addition  to this fixed cost, once a capital good is introduced,  its owner must
spend  a constant  maintenance  cost per period  of time.  This is equivalent  to assuming
that production  of x() involves  a constant  marginal  cost equal to unity and that capital
goods depreciate  fully.  Assuming  that the interest  rate r that firms face is constant,
profits  for the producer  of a varietyj, denoted 7(i),  are given  by
F(I) = -F + J  [m(j)x&)  - xU)]e'sds.  (2)
4 Borensztein,  De Gregorio,  and Lee (1998)  also  discuss  a second  possible  effect on F, namely,
the possibility  of a "catch-up"  effect  in technological  progress  reflecting  the fact that it may be cheaper  to
imitate  products  already  in existence  than to create new ones at the cutting  edge of innovation.  This
notion  is implemented  in their model by assuming  that setup  costs depend  positively  on the number  of
capital  varieties  produced  domestically,  compared  to  those  produced  in more  advanced  countries.
8Maximization  of (2) subject  to (1) yields  the equilibrium  level of production  of each
capital  good:
x()  = S(1 - a)21o,
which shows that, given the assumption  of symmetry  among producers,  the level of
production  of the different  varieties  of capital  is the same. 5 Assuming  free entry,  it can
be  shown  that the zero-profit  condition  implies  that
r = 4SIF,  (3)
where  a  - (1 - a)(2 -a)1  >  O.
To close the model requires  specifying  savings  decisions,  which determine  the
process  of capital  accumulation. Suppose  that households  face a rate of return  also
equal  to r and that they maximize  a standard  intertemporal  utility  function  given  by the
discounted  present  value  of consumption.  It can be shown (see e.g. Barro  and Sala-i-
Martin  (1995))  that the optimal  solution  is such  that the rate of growth  of consumption,
gc,  is driven  by:
gc  = (r- p)kv,  (4)
where  p is the rate of time preference  and 1/c measures  the intertemporal  elasticity  of
substitution. In a stationary  state,  the rate of growth  of consumption  must be equal to
the rate  of growth  of output,  g, that is, g = gc. Substituting  (3) in (4) yields  therefore  the
economy's  growth  rate:
g = [4SIF(n*IN)  - p]/.  (5)
5  Substituting the optimal level of production into equation (1) yields the constant equilibrium rental
rate, m(/) = 1/(1 - a), as a markup over maintenance  costs.
9Equation (5) shows that FDI, as  measured by the fraction of capital goods
produced  locally  by foreign  firms  in the  total number  of these  goods,  n*N, has a positive
effect  on the economy's  long-term  growth  rate.  The reason  is that FDI reduce, the cost
of introducing  new  varieties  of capital,  thereby  increasing  the rate at which  these  goods
are introduced. 6 Moreover,  the effect  of FDI on the economy's  growth  rate is positively
related to  the existing stock of skilled labor employed in  production--this  is the
complementarity  effect mentioned  earlier.  Put differently,  absorbing  the more advanced
technologies  that FDI provides  requires the presence  of a sufficiently  high level of
human  capital.
Another channel through which international  financial integration may affect
positively  the rate of economic  growth  is through  its effect on total factor productivity.
Levine  (2000) has argued  that, in principle,  the liberalization  of international  portfolio
capital flows may lead to higher rates of economic growth because  it may tend to
accelerate  the development  of domestic  equity  markets  and that, it turn, may lead to
increased  factor  productivity. 7
c. Enhanced  Macroeconomic  Discipline
It has also been argued  that by increasing  the rewards  of good policies  and the
penalties  for bad policies,  the free flow of capital  across  borders  may induce  countries
to follow more disciplined  macroeconomic  policies  and thus reduce  the frequency  of
policy  mistakes  (Obstfeld  (1998)).  To the extent  that greater  policy  discipline  translates
into greater macroeconomic  stability, it may also lead to higher rates of economic
growth, as emphasized  in the recent literature on endogenous  growth.  A  related
argument  is that external  financial  liberalization  can act as a "signal"  that a country  is
willing (or ready to) adopt "sound"  macroeconomic  policies,  for instance  by reducing
6 In addition to reducing costs associated with innovation activity, FDI can also have a -nore  direct
effect on growth-if,  for instance local firms involved in research activities are able to use ast least in part
the advanced knowledge that foreign firms possess. As discussed by Berthelemy and Demurger (2000),
it would then be the number of varieties of capital goods, and not the rate of change the capital stock, that
would affect long-run growth.
10budget  deficits  and  foregoing  the use of the inflation  tax (Bartolini  and Drazen  (1997)).
From  that perspective,  an open capital  account  may also encourage  macroeconomic
and financial  stability,  ensuring  a more  efficient  allocation  of resources  and higher  rates
of economic  growth.
d. Increased  Banking System  Efficiency and Financial Stability
An increasingly  common  argument  in favor of financial  openness  is that it may
increase  the depth  and breadth  of domestic  financial  markets  and lead to an increase  in
the degree  of efficiency  of the financial  intermediation  process,  by lowering  costs and
"excessive"  profits  associated  with monopolistic  or cartelized  markets,  thereby  lowering
the cost of investment  and improving  resource  allocation. 8 Levine (1996)  and Caprio
and Honohan  (1999),  for instance,  have  argued  that  foreign  bank  penetration  may
X  improve  the quality  and availability  of financial  services  in the domestic  market,
by increasing  the degree of bank competition  and enabling  the application  of more
sophisticated banking techniques and technology (such as  more  advanced risk
management  systems),  which  may improve  efficiency  by reducing  the cost of acquiring
and  processing  information  on potential  borrowers;
*  serve  to stimulate  the development  of the domestic  bank  supervisory  and legal
framework,  if the local  foreign banks  are supervised  on a consolidated  basis with  their
parent;
* enhance  a country's  access  to international  capital,  either directly  or indirectly
through  parent  banks;
* contribute  to the stability  of the domestic  financial  system  (and reduced  volatility
in capital  flows)  if, in periods  of financial  instability,  depositors  shift their  funds  to foreign
'  A similar  effect  may  be associated  with a higher  degree  of penetration  of foreign  banks  in
domestic  financial  markets,  as  discussed  below.
a Indeed,  the need  to improve  banking  sector  efficiency  in order  to reduce  the cost  of financial
intermediation  and  promote  investment  is a key policy  objective  in many  developing  countries.  It was
11institutions  that are perceived  to be more  sound  than domestically-owned  banks,  rather
than  transferring  assets  abroad  and  engage  in capital  flight.
In addition,  foreign  banks may also contribute  to an improvement  in the overall
quality  of the loan portfolios  of domestic  banks because  they are less  susceptible  to
government  pressure to lend to  "preferred"  borrowers--as  may be the case with
domestic  financial  institutions,  particularly  those  in  which  the  state  is involved.
2.  Potential  Costs
The experience  of the past  two decades  has led economists  and policymakers  to
recognize  that, in addition to the potential  benefits  just discussed,  open financial
markets  may also generate  significant  costs. Such potential  costs include  the high
degree  of concentration  of capital  flows and the lack of access  to financing  for small
countries,  either permanently  or when they need it most; an inadequate  domestic
allocation  of these  flows,  which  may hamper  their growth  effects  and exacerbate  pre-
existing  domestic  distortions;  the  loss  of macroeconomic  stability;  the pro-cyclical  nature
of short-term  capital  flows  and the risk  of abrupt  reversals;  a high  degree  of volatility  of
capital flows, which relates in  part to  herding and contagion effects; and risks
associated  with  foreign  bank  penetration.
a. Concentration  of Capital  Flows and Lack of Access
There is ample historical  evidence  to suggest  that periods  of "surge"  in cross-
border  capital flows tend to be highly concentrated  to a small number  of recipient
countries.  The dramatic  increase  in capital  inflows  in the early  1990s,  for instance,  was
directed  to only a small  number  of large,  middle-income  countries  of Latin  America  and
Asia  (see Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel  (1996)).  The  share  of total  private  capital  flows
going to low-income  countries  actually  fell during the 1990s  (from levels  that were
already quite low), whereas the share going to the top ten recipients increased
emphasized,  for instance,  in a recent report  of the International  Monetary  Fund on the economic
prospects  of  the  Caribbean  region  (see  Itam  et  al.  (2000)).
12significantly  (see  World  Bank  (2001a)).  Little  foreign  capital  flows to sub-Saharan  Africa
as a whole,  and most  of what is directed  to the region  is limited  to a few  countries  (such
as Nigeria and South Africa) with significant  natural resources  (see Bhattacharya,
Montiel,  and  Sharma  (1997)).
At the same time, however,  it should be noted that although many countries
received  a relatively  small  fraction  of flows  in absolute  terms,  several  of them received
sizable  inflows  in relative  terms (that  is, adjusting  for country  size).  This was the case
for instance  for Costa Rica  as well as several  other small countries  in Latin  America.
Consider,  for instance,  the data shown in Figure  2 for a large group of small states.
They indicate  that capital flows (which  consist mostly  of FDI) to several  small states
have  been rather  sporadic,  responding  to specific  incentives  such  as the introduction  of
tax free zones  or investment  in offshore  financial  activities.  At the same  time, the data
suggest  that some of these countries  (taking  into account  the size of their GDP)  did
indeed benefit  from the surge in inflows  to developing  countries  in the early 1990s.
Overall,  however,  it remains  true that many low-income  countries  simply do not have
access  to world  capital  markets.
Moreover,  access  to these markets  tends to be asymmetric.  Many developing
countries  (including  oil producers)  are able to borrow  on world capital  markets  only in
"good"  times,  whereas  in "bad"  times  they  tend  to face credit  constraints.  Access  is thus
pro-cyclical,  as discussed  further  below.  Clearly,  in such conditions,  one of the alleged
benefits  of accessing  world  capital  markets  (the ability  to borrow  to smooth  consumption
in the face of temporary  adverse  shocks),  is simply  a fiction.  Pro-cyclicality  may,  in fact,
have  a perverse  effect and increase  macroeconomic  instability:  favorable  shocks  may
attract  large  capital  inflows  and  encourage  consumption  and spending  at levels  that are
unsustainable  in the longer  term,  forcing  countries  to over-adjust  to adverse  shocks  as a
result  of abrupt  capital  reversals.
13b. Domestic  Misallocation  of Capital  Flows
Although  the capital  inflows  that are associated  with an open capital  account  may
raise domestic investment,  their impact on long-run growth may be limited (if not
negligible)  if such inflows are used to finance speculative  or  low-quality  domestic
investments--such  as  investments in  the  real  estate  sector.  Low-p'oductivity
investments  in the nontradables  sector  may reduce  over  time  the economy's  capacity  to
export  and lead  to growing  external  imbalances.
The misallocation  of capital inflows may in part be the result of pre-existing
distortions  in the domestic  financial system. In countries  with weak banks (that is,
banks  with low or negative  net worth and a low ratio  of capital  to risk-adjusted  assets)
and poor  supervision  of the financial  system,  the direct  or indirect  intermediation  of large
amounts  of funds by the banking  system  may exacerbate  the moral hazard  problems
associated  with (explicit  or implicit)  deposit insurance.  That is, lenders  may engage  in
riskier  and  more  concentrated  (or outright  speculative)  loan  operations.
An example  of how asymmetric  information  problems  can affect the benefits  of
capital  inflows  is provided  by Razin,  Sadka,  and Yuen (1999),  who focus on the impact
of FDI flows. They argue  that through  FDI and the transfer  of control  that it entails,
foreign  investors  may gain inside information  about the productivity  of the firm(s)  that
they are investing  in. This gives them an informational  advantage  over less informed
domestic  investors  (whose  holdings  of share  may be insufficient  to give them corporate
control)-an  advantage  that they may be tempted to exploit by retaining  the high-
productivity  firms and selling the low-productivity  ones to partially-informed  domestic
savers.  This type of adverse  selection  problems  can lead  to over-investment  by foreign
direct  investors.
c. Loss  of Macroeconomic  Stability
The large capital inflows induced by financial openness  can have urdesirable
macroeconomic  effects, including  rapid monetary  expansion  (due  to the difficulty  and
14cost of pursuing  aggressive  sterilization  policies),  inflationary  pressures  (resulting  from
the  effect  of capital  inflows  on domestic  spending),  real  exchange  rate appreciation,  and
widening  current account  deficits.  Under  a flexible  exchange  rate, growing  external
deficits  tend to bring about a currency  depreciation,  which may eventually  lead to a
realignment  of relative  prices  and induce  a self-correcting  movements  in  trade  flows.  By
contrast,  under a fixed exchange  rate regime,  losses in competitiveness  and growing
external  imbalances  can erode  confidence  in the viability  and sustainability  of the peg
and  thus precipitate  a currency  crisis  and increase  financial  instability.
d. Pro-cyclicality  of Short-Term  Flows
There is evidence  that short-term  capital  flows to developing  countries  appear  to
be pro-cyclical,  A  recent World Bank study, for instance, based on data for  33
developing  countries during 1986-98,  found that such flows tend to increase  when
economic growth is  cyclically  faster and decline when growth rates fall  (Dadush,
Dasgupta,  and Ratha  (2000)).9  In contrast,  medium-  and long-term  debt  appeared  to be
weakly  counter-cyclical  to GDP  shocks.  By itself,  this pro-cyclical  behavior  may not  be
a  cause  for concern  if it results  from changes  in demand in the developing  countries
themselves.  In practice,  however,  it often arises  from  external,  supply-side  factors,  such
as a sudden  change  in the country's  terms  of trade,  which raises  the risk  perceptions  of
lenders;  it tends therefore  to magnify  the impact  of a shock. Indeed,  the same study
found that the pro-cyclical  response  to be twice as large when a country faces an
adverse  terms-of-trade  shock relative  to when  it faces  a positive  shock.
There are essentially  two reasons  that may explain  the pro-cyclical  behavior  of
short-term  capital  flows.  First, economic  shocks  tend to be larger  and more  frequent  in
developing  countries,  reflecting  these countries'  relatively  narrow production  base  and
greater.dependence  on primary  commodity  exports.  A common  adverse shock to a
9 The study  found that the elasticity  of short-term  debt with respect  to GDP was about  0.9 when
GDP  growth  experiences  a positive  shock  (defined  as a rate  of growth  that is one-half  standard  deviation
or more  above  the mean  growth  rate),  but 1.8  when  an  adverse  shock  occurs  (that is, when  GDP growth
15group  of countries  may cause  a deterioration  in some countries'  creditworthiness,  as a
result of abrupt changes  in risk perception.  This can lead to marginally  creditworthy
borrowers  being  "squeezed  out"  of world  capital  markets.  Dadush,  Dasgupta,  arid Ratha
(2000) found indeed  evidence  of a nonlinear  relationship  between  a measure  of of
creditors'  risk perception  and economic  shocks  in developing  countries;  perceived  risk
appears  to increase  more during  a large  adverse  shock  than it declines  during  a small
adverse or a positive shock. Second, asymmetric  information  problems  may trigger
herding  behavior  (as  further  discussed  below)  because  partially-informed  investors  may
rush to withdraw "en masse" their capital in response  to an adverse  shocK  whose
economic  consequences  for the  country  are not  fully  understood.
e. Herding,  Contagion, and Volatility of Capital  Flows
A high degree  of financial  openness  may also be conducive  to a high degree  of
volatility  in capital  movements,  a specific  manifestation  of which  being  large reversals  in
short-term  flows associated  with speculative  pressures  on the domestic  currency.  The
possibility  of large reversals  of short-term  capital  flows raises  the risk that borrowers
may face costly "liquidity runs", as discussed  for instance by Chang and Velasco
(2000).  The higher the level of short-term  debt is relative  to the borrowing  country's
international  reserves,  the greater  the risk  of such  runs  will be. High  levels  of short-term
liabilities  intermediated  by the financial system also create risks of bank runs and
systemic  financial  crises.
In general,  the degree of volatility  of capital  flows is related to both actual and
perceived  movements  in domestic  economic  fundamentals,  as well as external  factors,
such as movements  in world interest rates. 10 More generally,  the fact that investor
sentiment  (particularly  that of highly leveraged,  speculative  trading  institutions,  such  as
is one-half  standard  deviation  or more  below  the  mean).  In other  words,  the  rate  of decline  of short-term
debt  during  an  adverse  shock  was  twice as  high  as its rate  of increase  during  a positive  shock.
10  Volatility  can also  be magnified  by domestic  market  distortions.  To the extent  that private  capital
flows  are channeled  to the  domestic  economy  through  commercial  banks,  credit  market  inefficiencies  can
magnify  the effect  of changes  in, say, external  interest  rates,  and lead to fluctuations  in domestic  output
that may  have  feedback  effects  on  capital  flows  (see  Agenor  and  Aizenman  (1999)).
16hedge funds) is constantly  changing in response  to  new information  creates the
potential  for markets  to overshoot  on a scale  that can generate  financial  crises  with  very
large  economic  and  social  costs.  Short-term  portfolio  flows,  in particular,  tend  to be very
sensitive  to herding  among  investors  and contagious  factors.  Although  investor  herding
is seen  by some as evidence  of irrationality,  some recent  literature  suggests  differently
Herding  can be a "rational"  response  in the presence  of several  effects  (Devenow  and
Welch  (1996)):
*  payoff  externalities,  which  are related  to the fact that the payoff  to an agent
(investor)  adopting  a specific  action may be positively  related to the number  of
other  agents  adopting  the  same  action;
*  principal-agent  considerations,  which result from the fact that a portfoliW
manager,  in order  to maintain  or improve  his or her reputation  when markets  are
imperfectly  informed,  may prefer either to "hide in the herd" to avoid evaluation
and  criticism,  or to "ride  the herd"  to generate  reputational  gains;
i  information  cascades,  which  are due to the fact that (small)  agents  that are
only beginning  to invest in a country may find it optimal to ignore their owrk
information  and  follow  the behavior  of larger  and more  established  investors."
Nevertheless,  rational or irrational, herding behavior often translate into Iarg;
movements  into and out of certain  types  of assets  and exacerbate  fluctuations  in asse-
prices  and capital  movements.
" Consider,  for instance,  the model  of Calvo  and  Mendoza  (1997),  which  assumes  a global  mark-  !
with many  identical  investors  forming  decisions  simultaneously.  Investors  determine  (for given  means  ar o
variances  of asset  returns)  the optimal  trade-off  between  diversification  and costly-information  collect;cn.
With informational  frictions,  rational herding  behavior  may become  more prevalent  as the world  capi-iq'
market grows. The reason is that globalization  reduces the  incentives  to  collect country-speuifi..
information  to discredit  rumors  and increases  the likelihood  that fund managers  who worry about  the;(
relative  performance  will each select  the  same portfolio.  Consequently,  small rumors  can induce  herdinrj
behavior  and lead  to large  capital  oufflows  (seemingly  unrelated  with  a country's  economic  fundamentals,
and  a self-fulfilling  speculative  currency  attack.
17Volatility  of capital  flows  can also result  from  contagion  effects.  Financial  contagion
may occur when a country  suffers  massive  capital outflows  triggered  by a perceived
increase  by international  investors  in the vulnerability  of a country's  currency,  or, more
generally,  a loss of confidence  in the country's  economic  prospects,  as a result of
developments  elsewhere  (see Dornbusch,  Park, and Claessens  (2000),  and Masson
(2000)).  It may also occur through  two other channels,  with indirect effects on the
volatility  of capital  flows:  through  terms-of-trade  shocks  or competitiveness  effects.  An
example  of the former effect is provided  by the events  that followed  the Asia crisis,
which  led  to a sharp  reduction  in  the demand  for imports  by crisis-stricken  countries  and
a sharp drop in world commodity  prices. By increasing  the degree of uncertainty
regarding  the short-term  economic  prospects  of a country,  terms-of-trade  shocks  may
translate  into financial  contagion--as  appeared  to have  happened  in the case  of Chile  in
late 1997  and early 1998. As an example  of the latter effect,  the sharp  depreciation  of
the Thai baht that began in July 1997 put pressure  on the currencies  of neighboring
countries  that maintained  a pegged  exchange  rate, in part because  it implied  a loss  of
competitiveness  for  these countries  (see  Alba  et al. (1999)).
f  Risk of Entry by Foreign Banks
Although foreign bank penetration  can  yield several types  of  benefits (as
discussed  earlier),  it also has some potential  drawbacks  as well.  First,  foreign banks
may ration  credit  to small  firms (which  tend to operate  in the nontradables  sector)  to a
larger  extent  than domestic  banks,  and  concentrate  instead  on larger  and stronger  ones
(which are often involved  in the production  of tradables).  If foreign banks do indeed
follow  a strategy  of concentrating  their lending  operations  only to the most  creditworthy
corporate  (and, to a lesser extent,  household)  borrowers,  their presence  wilt be less
likely to contribute  to an overall increase  in efficiency  in the financial sector. More
importantly,  by leading  to a higher  degree of credit rationing  to small  firms, they may
have  an adverse  effect  on output,  employment,  and income  distribution.
Second,  entry of foreign banks,  which tend to have lower operational  costs, can
create  pressures  on local  banks  to merge  in order  to remain  competitive.  The process  of
18concentration  (which  could  also arise  as foreign  banks  acquire  local  banks)  could  create
banks that are "too big to fail"--as  monetary  authorities  may fear that the failure  of a
single large bank could seriously  disrupt  financial markets.  Although  these potential
problems  could  be mitigated  through  enhanced  prudential  supervision  or an outright  ban
on mergers  that are perceived  to increase  systemic  risks  sharply,  they may lead to an
undesirable  extension  of the scope and cost of the official  safety net. A too-big-to-fail
problem  may, in turn, increase  moral hazard  problems:  knowing  the existence  of an
(implicit) safety net, domestic banks may be less careful in allocating credit and
screening  potential  borrowers.  Concentration  could also create monopoly  power  that
would reduce  the overall  efficiency  of the banking  system  and the availability  of credit.
In particular,  a high degree of banking system concentration  may adversely  affect
output  and growth  by yielding  both higher  interest  rate spreads  (with higher  loan rates
and lower  deposit  rates  relative  to competitive  credit and deposit  markets)  and a lower
amount  of loans  than  in a less  concentrated,  more  competitive  system.
Third, entry of foreign banks may not lead to enhanced  stability  of the domestic
banking  system,  because  their presence  per se does  not  make  systemic  banking  crises
less likely  to occur--as  may happen  if the economy  undergoes  a deep and prolonged
recession,  leading to a massive increase  in default rates and an across-the-board
increase  in nonperforming  loans,  and because  they may have  a tendency  to "cut and
run"  during  a crisis. 12 To some extent,  the latter  effect  could  in principle  be mitigated  by
strengthening  prudential  supervision  in domestic  markets and improving  information
sharing  between  supervisors  in industrial  and receiving  countries.  In practice,  however,
countries  have very few options to prevent  foreign banks from, say, cutting lines of
credit  to domestic  borrowers  in a crisis.
12 Some observers have argued that the fact that foreign banks may withdraw abruptly after a
period of time if they fail to establish profitable operations is also a potential drawback associated with
foreign bank entry. However, what is problematic is the context  in which a foreign bank is withdrawing
(whether it is during a crisis or not), not the fact that it chooses to close its doors because it is unable to
make profits (which, in itself, may actually be a desirable outcome).
19111.  WHAT  IS THE EVIDENCE?
The foregoing  discussion  suggests  that,  from a purely analytical  point  of view, it
cannot  be established  a priori whether  the benefits  of financial  openness  are likely  to
outweigh  its potential costs. This section  examines the empirical evidence  on the
various costs and benefits identified earlier in order to determine if, on balance,
unambiguous  conclusions  can be offered. At the outset,  it is important  to note  that the
task is far from being straightforward,  although  the historical evidence  for smaller
industrial  countries  appears  to suggest  substantial  net benefits. 13 The reason  is that to
quantify the gains countries can reap from international  financial integration  would
require,  to be rigorous,  a fully-articulated  model  in which  the counterfactual  of financial
autarky could be simulated. So far  there has been no  such ambitious attempt.
Nevertheless,  a  selective review of the evidence, both formal (econometric)  and
informal (country experiences),  is  provided here, beginning with a  review of the
determinants  of the volatility of capital flows and continuing  with the impact of the
degree  of financial  openness  and capital  flows on domestic  investment  and growth;  the
macroeconomic  effects  of large  capital  inflows  (dwelling  mostly  on the experience  of the
early  1  990s);  and  the effect  of foreign  bank  entry  on the performance  and stability  of the
domestic  financial  system. 14
a. Volatility of Capital  Flows
As discussed  earlier, it has been argued  that short-term  capital  flows tend to be
more unstable  than longer-term  flows, and thus more conducive  to financial crises.
Several  studies have attempted  to examine  the degree of volatility (or, conversely,
"  See Obstfeld (1998). The evidence gathered by Lewis (1996) also suggests that, historically,
economies with  closed capital  accounts have  tended to  experience a  higher  degree of  volatility of
domestic consumption.
14  1 abstract in what follows from discussing empirical studies of the indirect effect of international
financial integration (namely, the  liberalization of portfolio investment rules) on  domestic stock market
development, factor productivity, and growth. See, most notably, Levine (2000) and the  Norld  Bank
(2001b, pp. 169-78). In my view, the existing evidence is far from compelling, in part because of the
notorious  difficulties involved in estimating accurately total factor productivity.
20persistence)  of cross-border  capital  flows during  the past two decades.  In one of the
early  studies  on this topic,  Claessens,  Dooley,  and  Warner  (1995)  were  unable  to detect
significant  differences  in the volatility  patterns  of FDI, portfolio  equity,  long-term  debt,
and  short-term  debt  flows.  Several  subsequent  studies,  however,  have  reached  different
conclusions;  most  of them have  found  that FDI  tends  to be less  volatile  than  other  forms
of capital flows. Chuhan,  Perez-Quiros,  and Popper (1996),  for instance,  found that
short-term  capital  flows respond  more dramatically  to financial  disturbances  than FDI
flows.  Another  recent  analysis  by Brewer  and Nollen  (2000)  of 17 developing  countries
that  were  major  recipients  of FDI  during  the past  two  decades  yielded  similar  results.  On
the basis of annual  data for FDI flows and total portfolio  flows for the period 1985-94,
they found that in 11 of the 13 countries  for which comparisons  could be made,  the
coefficient  of variation  was greater  for portfolio  flows than for FDI flows.  Finally,  Sarno
and Taylor (1999), using a  decomposition  of  various types of capital flows into
permanent  (trend) and transitory  (cyclical)  components,  found that FDI has a higher
permanent  component  than other  flows. 15
Many countries suffered large reversals in short-term  capital flows during the
recent  financial  crises,  precipitating  severe  external  liquidity  crises.  For instance,  in the
wake of the Asia crisis, whereas developing countries received short-term  capital
inflows  from BIS-reporting  banks  of $43.5 billion  in 1997,  they suffered  outflows  of $85
billion  in 1998. FDI, by contrast,  remained  remarkably  stable (see Dadush,  Dasgupta,
and Ratha  (2000)).16  The evidence  suggests  that volatility  in capital  inflows  has tended
to translate into exchange rate instability  (under flexible exchange rates), or large
15  The finding  that FDI flows tend to be more stable  than other types of flows should  be taken,
however,  with some degree  of caution.  First, because  FDI as conventionally  measured  includes  the
retained  earnings  of all previous  FDI  flows, it tends to display  more inertia.  Second,  the classification  of
direct and portfolio  flows in balance-of-payments  statistics  is somewhat  arbitrary.  Foreign  investment  in
the equity  of a company  above a critical  proportion  (say, 10 percent)  of outstanding  equity  is usually
classified  as FDI,  whereas  that below  the  critical  threshold  is classified  as portfolio  investment.  However,
small  differences  above  or below  the threshold  do not necessarily  represent  any significant  difference  in
the  intentions  of investors.
16 It should  be noted  that, in practice,  "FDI reversals"  can also  occur,  even  though  physical  capital
(such  as buildings  and heavy  equipment)  cannot be  easily moved  out of a country  at short  notice.  Such
reversals  can be accomplished  through  financial  transactions.  For instance,  the foreign  subsidiary  in the
host country  can borrow  domestically  against  its local assets and then transfer  (lend) the funds to its
parent  company  abroad.
21fluctuations  in official reserves  (under  a pegged  exchange  rate regime)  and sometimes
currency  crises.  There is also some evidence  that instability  has increaserd  in equity
markets  in developing  countries,  although  the robustness  of this evidence s open to
question. Financial  volatility  may  have  adverse  effects  on the real  side as we 1--nominal
exchange rate volatility, in  particular, may hamper the  expansion of  exports if
appropriate  hedging  techniques  are not  available  to domestic  producers.
b. Impact on Investment and Growth
Studies examining  the impact of international  financial integration  on domestic
investment  and growth can be classified  in two groups.  The first group atempts to
measure  directly  the impact of capital account liberalization  by exploiting qualitative
information  on restrictions  on capital  movements,  whereas  the second  uses  tie  level  of
capital flows as a proxy measure  for the degree of financial openness. There are
significant  differences  between  these  two approaches.
Two recent  studies  focusing  directly  on the impact  of capital  account  liberalization
on growth  are those of Klein and Olivei  (1999)  and Artera,  Eichengreen,  and Wyplosz
(2001). In both  studies  the degree  of capital  account  liberalization  is measured  by an
index of capital account restrictions,  calculated  using IMF data on  exchange  rate
arrangements  and exchange  restrictions.  The first study found that capital account
liberalization  has no discernible  effect on growth  in developing  countries.  The second
study found some evidence  of a positive  link between  the index of capital account
openness and  growth, but  only when  countries are  already sufficiently open
commercially  and face limited macroeconomic  imbalances.  This is an important  result
because  it brings  to the  fore  the issue  of sequencing  of reforms.
The second group of studies is based on the view that actual levels  of capital
movements  provide a good proxy for the effective  degree of financial openness. It
includes  those of Bosworth  and Collins (2000), Borensztein,  De Gregorio.  and Lee
(1998),  and Gruben  and McLeod  (1998).  Bosworth  and Collins  used panel regression
22techniques  to evaluate  the impact  of capital inflows  on investment  on a group of 58
developing  countries  for the period  1978-95.  They found  that FDI flows have  a positive
(and almost one for one) impact on investment,  whereas portfolio flows have no
discernible  effect. Borensztein,  De Gregorio,  and Lee (1998), using FDI flows from
industrial  countries  to 69 developing  countries  during  the period  1970-89,  found  that the
link between  FDI and growth  was positive  and significant.  A similar  result  was  obtained
by Gruben and McLeod  (1998). Moreover,  Borensztein,  De Gregorio,  and Lee also
found that there is complementarity  between  FDI and human capital (proxied  by a
measure  of educational  attainment)  in affecting  growth,  as hypothesized  in the growth
model  highlighted  earlier,  and  that FDI has a positive  (although  not very robust)  impact
on aggregate  domestic  investment.
For illustrative  purposes,  Figure  3 shows  the correlation  between  gross domestic
investment  rates and the ratio of foreign  direct investment  to GDP in small states  (as
defined  in Appendix  B)  for two sub-periods:  1980-89  and 1990-98.  Although  there does
not  appear  to be strong  evidence  of any relation  during  the first sub-period,  there  seems
to be a closer  positive  correlation  during  the 1990s.  Figure  4 presents  similar  results  for
the  share  of FDI  in GDP  and the  growth  rate  of real  per capita  GDP  in small  states;  here
the positive  association  between  these  two variables  appears  to be closer,  even  for the
sub-period  1980-99.
The foregoing  discussion  relied  on the assumption  that greater  financial  openness
translates into larger capital inflows.  There is  indeed evidence supporting this
contention,  at least on average  and over a sufficient  period  of time.  As a result,  using
the  size of capital  inflows  as a proxy  for the degree  of financial  integration  is a sensible
approach  when  the focus  is on longer-term  movements  in investment  and  growth,  given
also the practical  difficulties  involved  in constructing  a quantitative  index of financial
openness.  However,  the relation  between  the degree  of capital  account  openness  and
capital inflows  is not always very close, particularly  in the short term; a country  can
experience  periods  of low inflows  (as a result,  say, of a change in market sentiment),
23regardless of how open its capital account is. This raises the issue of understanding  and
identifying both the short- and long-term determinants  of capital flows themselves.
There is by now a sizable literature, most of it reviewed in Agenor (200D,  Chapter
6),  focusing  on  the  determinants of  private  capital  flows  during  the  1990s and
distinguishing between "push" (or external) and "pull" (or domestic) factors. Appendix A
presents cross-section, time-series regressions that attempt to explain the determinants
of FDI to small states during the period 1980-98. Both domestic and external factors are
considered as potential explanatory variables and an instrumental variables estimation
technique is used to account for the possible endogeneity of some of the regressors.
Interestingly enough, the  two  variables  that  come  out  to  be the  most  statistically
significant in these regressions are the rate of real output growth (which may act as a
proxy for the rate of return on domestic investments) and the degree of trade openness
(as measured by the  ratio of exports plus imports to GDP).  Thus, the  relationship
between financial integration (as proxied by the size of FDI flows) and growh  appears
to be bi-directional for that group of countries: capital inflows may have a positive effect
on growth, but growth in turn tends to stimulate the inflow of FDI. This is an important
result because it highlights the possibility of a "virtuous circle" between capital flows and
growth-enhancing policies.  It also implies that studies of the impact of FDI on growth
that do not account for the endogenous nature of capital flows (that is, the fact that FDI
can be itself influenced by the economy's growth rate) are likely to produce estimated
coefficients that are subject to significant bias.
Thus, to the extent that the size of capital flows (particularly in the form of FDI) can
be seen as an adequate proxy for the degree of financial openness, it would appear that
financial integration has a positive effect on domest:ic  investment and growth (for the
reasons indicated above), with possibly strong feedback effects as well.  There is also
some microeconomic evidence--discussed by Eichengreen (2001) and the World Bank
(2001a)--suggesting  that private capital flows may enhance productivity, particularly in
countries  with  a  relatively  skilled  labor  force  and  a  well-develope(i  physical
infrastructure. Haddad and Harrison (1993), for instance, in a study of the  impact of
24foreign  investment  on firms in Morocco's  manufacturing  sector  during  the period  1985-
89, found that although  domestic  firms exhibit  lower levels  of total factor productivity,
their  rate of productivity  growth  is higher  than  that for foreign  firms. Moreover,  domestic
firms  exhibit  higher  levels  of productivity  in sectors  with a larger  foreign  presence.' 7 At
the same  time, however,  there is some evidence  suggesting  that domestic  firms may
not be able  to capitalize  on the transfer  of knowledge  associated  with FDI because  the
entry  of foreign  firms  may lead  to losses  in market  share  and reduced  productivity,  as a
result of  a  contraction in  output (Aitken and  Harrison (1999)). More generally,
microeconomic  evidence  is important  in judging  the impact  of capital  flows on the  quality
of domestic  investment.  Indeed,  one lesson  from the  Asia crisis  is that high,  aggregate
ratios  of capital  formation  to GDP  can mask  a sharp  decline  in the productivity  of these
these  investments.
Finally,  it should  be noted  that none of the econometric  studies  referred  to above
tests  for the existence  of an adverse  effect of the volatility  of capital  flows (as opposed
to  their  leve/) on  investment and  growth. As  the  literature on  uncertainty and
irreversibility  in investment  decisions  has emphasized  (see, for instance, Dixit and
Pindyck  (1994)),  uncertainty  about  the availability  of external  finance  in the future may
deter investment,  particularly  in projects that have a long gestation periods. Some
preliminary  evidence  by the World Bank (2001a)  suggests  indeed  that the volatility  of
private  capital  flows (as  measured  by the standard  deviation  of these  flows) has indeed
an adverse  effect on per capita growth  rates. But the volatility  of capital  flows is itself
endogenous,  because  it may  arise not  only  from  external  factors  but  also from  domestic
causes.  In such  conditions,  modeling  the sources  of volatility  is essential. For all these
reasons,  one should  therefore  be cautious  in judging the robustness  of the available
empirical  evidence. Nevertheless,  the existing  empirical  evidence  seems to provide
some degree of robustness  to the view that it is mostly FDI that affects significantly
domestic  investment  and growth.
17  Haddad and  Harrison also  found  that  there  is  no  significant relationship  between  higher
productivity growth in domestic firms and greater foreign presence in the sector.  They argue that this
result may be due to the distortionary effects associated with tariff protection--foreign firms lag behind
domestic firms in productivity growth in protected markets.
25c. Macroeconomic  Effects
The experience of the early to mid-1990s (as discussed by Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart (1996) and by Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel (1996), among others) reveals  that
several large recipients of capital inflows suffered from some, or a combinatiorl of some,
of  the  potential  problems  identified  earlier--namely, a  rapid  increase  in  liquidity,
inflationary  pressures,  real  exchange  rate  appreciation,  and  growing  external
imbalances.  That  was particularly the case in the  main  recipient countrie,  in Latin
America (compared to those in Asia), as a result of various factors.1 8 The deterioration
in competitiveness weakened the credibility of fixed exchange rate regimes in some of
these countries and raised questions about their sustainability. Overall, the experience
of  the  1990s suggests that  some types of  policy  responses (such as  Lliisterilized
intervention, or a tightening of fiscal policy) can be effective in mitigating the adverse
macroeconomic effects of large capital inflows in the short term; over time, however,
sustained inflows of capital may lead to large macroeconomic and financial im1balances
(which may be compounded by a weak banking system, as noted earlier), particularly
under a regime of pegged exchange rates.
c.  Entry of Foreign Banks
During the  1990s,  the  presence of  foreign-owned  banks  in  developing  and
transition economies increased dramatically. As  shown  in Table  1 (taken from  the
Capital markets Report of the International Monetary Fund (2000)) in Central Europe,
for instance, the proportion of total bank assets controlled by foreign-owned banks rose
from 8 percent in 1994 to 56 percent in 1999. In some major Latin American countries,
almost 50 percent of total bank assets are now controlled by foreign institutions. 19 Only
in Asia, did foreign bank penetration remain stable.
18  Chief  among  them  were the  greater  reliance  on pegged  exchange  rates  in Latin  America  (which
provide  no "cushion"  when  residual  inflation  is high);  the different  composition  of inflows  (foreign  direct
investment  flows  accounted  for a larger  share  of inflows  to Asian  countries);  the allocation  of these  flows
(with  a more  pronounced  tendency  to allocate  flows  to investment  in Asia,  as opposed  to consumption  in
Latin  America);  and  the better  ability  of Asian  countries  to sterilize  and  control  the money  supply.
19  It should  be noted  that changes  in restrictions  on foreign  bank entry have been motivated in
several  countries  not only by a desire  to improve  the levels of competition  and efficiency  in the banking
26From  the point  of view  of international  financial  integration  two important  questions
that arise  in this context  are, as noted  earlier,  what impact  has  foreign  entry had on the
profitability  and efficiency  of domestic  banks,  and whether  it has improved  the financial
system's  ability to respond  to large domestic  and external  shocks.  The evidence  on
these issues, and more generally  on the net benefits of foreign bank penetration,
remains relatively limited. Claessens,  Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga (2000) studied
empirically  the cost and profitability  effects of foreign banks, in both developed  and
developing  countries.  They considered  a sample  consisting  of bank-level  data for 80
countries  covering  the period 1988-95,  with about 7900 individual  commercial  bank
observations.  They considered  a bank  to be foreign-owned  if 50 percent  or more  of its
capital was owned by foreign residents. They found that increased  penetration  of
foreign  banks  in the domestic  banking  system  (as  measured  by the relative  importance
of foreign banks in either the total number  of banks, or total assets,  of the banking
system) is associated  with a reduction in both profitability  and overhead  costs for
domestic  banks. By contrast,  the effect on net interest margins  (that is, the ex post
spread  between  lending  and deposit  rates),  which  can be viewed  as a measure  of the
efficiency  of financial  intermediation,  is not  significant.
Demirgu,-Kunt and  Huizinga (1999), using a  similar data set,  found that
differences  in interest margins  and bank profitability  reflect a variety of determinants:
bank characteristics,  macroeconomic  conditions,  explicit and implicit bank taxation,
deposit insurance regulation, overall financial structure, and underlying legal and
institutional  indicators.  A larger ratio of bank assets  to gross domestic  product  and a
lower market concentration  ratio lead to lower margins and profits, controlling  for
differences  in bank activity,  leverage,  and the macroeconomic  environment.  Foreign
banks  were  found  to have  higher  margins  and profits  than  domestic  banks  in developing
countries,  while the opposite  held in industrial  countries.  They also found that the
corporate  tax burden  was fully passed  onto bank customers,  whereas  higher reserve
system  (as advocates  of financial  integration  would  argue) but also by the more pressing  need  to help
reduce  restructuring  and  recapitalization  costs  of  troubled  domestic  banks  following  a financial  crisis.
27[equirements  were not, especially in developing  countries. Overall, therefore, the
evidence  appears  to suggest  that the competitive  pressures  created by foreign bank
entry  led  to improvements  in banking  system  efficiency.
However,  the fact that this conclusion  holds  "on average"  across  a large group  of
countries  (given  the very nature of regressions  with pooled,  time-series  cross-section
data)  cannot  be construed  as supportive  evidence  for any particular  subset  of countries
or country. A particular  problem with the above studies  is that, in part to alleviate
degrees-of-freedom  problems, the  authors perform their  estimation in  samples
consisting  of both industrial  and developing  countries.  However,  it is not obvious  that
pooling countries with very different financial characteristics  is warranted;  because
proper  statistical  tests for the adequacy  of pooling  are not reported  by the authors,  one
cannot  conclude  that their results  hold for any group of developing  countries--nor,  for
that matter,  any particular  country.
There is therefore  an urgent need  to conduct  more  focused  empirical  studies  (at
the regional  or country level)  to assess  the impact  of foreign bank penetration  on the
performance  of domestic  banks in developing  countries.  Clarke et al. (2000),  for
instance,  used  data  for the period  1995  to 1997  to analyze  the impact  of foreign entry
on domestic  banks in Argentina  and found that foreign penetration  increased  overall
efficiency  in the banking  sector  and raised  competitive  pressures  on domestic  financial
institutions.  However,  their analysis  did not address  the issue of adverse  effects on
credit allocation  to small  and medium-sized  enterprises.  20 Research  on Argentina  and
other countries  in Latin  American  and elsewhere--such  as Brazil,  where foreign bank
penetration  increased  also significantly  in the second  half of the 1  990s--is  necessary  to
assess  the robustness  of their policy  conclusions.
As a first and informal  look at the issue  of the impact  of foreign  bank entry  on the
domestic  banking  system in small states, Figures  3 to 10 present scatter diagrams
28based  on data  from  the  same source  as the  two studies  referred  to above  (Bankscope).
Averages  over the period 1991-2000  are used, in an attempt to discern longer-run
trends.  The  evidence  suggested  by these  figures  is somewhat  mixed.  Figure  5 suggests
that overhead  costs of foreign banks (measured  in proportion  of their assets) are
actually  larger  than those of domestic  banks;  this appears  to be the case in Barbados,
Botswana,  and Estonia.  At the same  time,  however,  overhead  costs  of domestic  banks
are significantly  higher  in Gabon,  Trinidad,  and Guyana.  Cost-to-income  ratios,  shown
in Figure  6, suggest  a similar  mixed  pattern.  Figure  7 shows  an indicator  of profitability,
net interest  margins,  for both  domestic  and  foreign  banks.  The  figure  suggests  that in all
the countries  considered,  foreign banks are more profitable  than domestic  banks, as
argued  in a related  context  by Bossone,  Honohan,  and Long (2001).  Finally,  Figures  8
to 10 attempt  to assess  the correlation  between  entry of foreign  banks  (as measured  by
the share  of total bank  assets  held by foreign  banks)  and the performance  of domestic
banks. Figure 8  suggests  that penetration  of foreign does not appear to have a
systematic  and unambiguous  effect on the overhead costs of domestic banks, in
contrast  to the negative  relationship  predicted  by some.  Similar results  appear  to hold
for the profitability  of domestic  banks,  as suggested  in Figures  9 (using  net income  of
domestic  banks)  and 10 (using  net interest  margin of domestic  banks).  These results
are, of course, illustrative  and more formal  econometric  tests are needed  before any
strong conclusion can  be  drawn regarding the  entry of  foreign banks on  the
performance  of the domestic  financial  system  in small states.  What emerges  from this
discussion, nevertheless,  is  that  although some  empirical studies indicate that
competitive  pressures  associated  with entry of foreign banks appear to have led on
average  to improvements  in banking  system efficiency  (in terms of lower operating
costs  and smaller margins  between  lending  and deposit interest  rates), more detailed
studies  are needed  to verify  if these results  hold  for any particular  group  of developing
countries  (such  as small  states)  or for specific  countries.
20  Clarke et al. (2000) do note that foreign banks in Argentina have tended to concentrate  their loan
operations in the manufacturing sector (leaving consumer lending largely to domestic banks) but they do
not address the issue of size of borrowers.
29Another  issue,  as noted  earlier,  is whether  entry  of foreign  banks  has improved  the
domestic  financial  system's  ability  to respond  to large internal  and external  shocks.  As
noted earlier, a possible reason why domestic  financial instability  may increase  is
because  foreign banks may shift funds abruptly  from one market to another  as the
perceived  risk-adjusted  returns in these markets  change--possibly  as a result of a
sudden change in expectations.  To the extent that foreign banks mar,age  their
exposures  to developing  countries  on a consolidated  basis,  a decision  to cut exposures
to an individual  country  could  involve  reductions  in both cross-border  lending  and local
operations.  The evidence  on this issue is very limited. In one of the few studies
available,  Goldberg,  Dages  and Kinney  (2000)  examined  the lending  behavior  of foreign
and domestic  banks in Argentina  and Mexico  in the period surrounding  the 1994-95
Mexican crisis and concluded  that  foreign banks exhibited stronger loan growth
compared  to all domestic-owned  banks,  with lower associated  volatility,  and thereby
contributed  to greater  stability  in the amount  of credit  allocated  by the overall  financial
system. Furthermore,  they found strong similarities in the portfolio composition  of
lending  and the volatility  of lending  by private  foreign  and domestic  banks  in Argentina,
while  the same  was true in Mexico  for banks  with low levels  of problem  loans.  Overall,
they argued  that bank  health,  and not ownership  per se, was  the critical  element  in the
growth  and volatility  of bank  credit.  At the same  time,  however,  the recent  experience  of
other countries  appears  to indicate  that foreign  banks may indeed  "cut and run"  during
crisis periods and may not therefore represent  a stable source of domestic  funding
(International  Monetary  Fund (2000),  and Marhieson  and Roldos  (2001)).  1-hus,  there
does not appear  to be clear  support  for the view  that a greater  foreign bank,  presence
contributes  to a  more stable domestic financial system and less volatility in the
availability  of credit.  Making  strong  claims  in these  areas  is thus premature.
Yet another  issue is whether  foreign banks  can contribute  to the stability  of the
domestic  deposit  base. Here  the evidence  appears  to be mostly  ane*cdotal.  "Flight  to
quality"  was a widespread  phenomenon  during  the Asian financial  crisis,  as depositors
shifted  funds from finance companies  (at least in Thailand)  and small banks toward
larger banks,  especially  foreign financial  institutions.  The market share of deposits  in
30foreign banks tripled in Korea  and Indonesia  between  January 1997 and July 1998,
while in Thailand  it increased  from 2 percent  of total deposits  to 5 percent  in the period
December  1996  to December  1997  (International  Monetary  Fund  (2000,  p. 170)).
IV. CONCLUSIONS  AND POLICY  LESSONS
The purpose  of this paper  has been to review  the analytical  arguments  for and
against international financial integration and  to  examine whether the  empirical
evidence  suggests  that countries  can (on average,  at least) can expect net benefits
from it  and, if  so, what conditions  are required to maximize them. A  first issue
addressed  in the paper  is the view  that, in principle,  financial  openness  allows  countries
to use international  capital  markets  to diversify  and hedge  against  both  idiosyncratic  and
global  risks,  particularly  when  those  risks  are temporary.  It was  argued  that, in practice,
this alleged benefit is often a mirage  for small developing  countries,  which often get
access  to these markets  (if at all) only in "good"  times;  as a result,  the opportunities  for
global  risk  sharing  and consumption  smoothing  are simply  not  there.
A second  issue  discussed  in the paper  is the role of entry of foreign  banks.  Some
of the recent  evidence  on the effects  of foreign  bank  penetration  appears  to support  the
view that the competitive  pressures  that it creates have led to improvements  in the
efficiency  of domestic  banks and financial intermediation  in general  in terms of lower
operating  costs  and reduced  net interest  margins.  However,  whether  these conclusions
hold for particular  sub-groups  of developing  countries,  or individual  countries  for that
matter,  remains  to be established.  Moreover,  there is as yet limited  evidence  regarding
whether  a greater  foreign bank  presence  contributes  to a more  stable banking  system
and less  volatility  in the availability  of domestic  credit.  In fact, the risk  that foreign  banks
may lead to credit rationing  to small  firms (particularly  in the nontradables  sector)  and
greater  concentration  in the allocation  of credit (with adverse  effects  on the distribution
31of income)  must be taken seriously.  The sharp increase  in foreign bank penetration
observed  in Eastern Europe  and Latin America  during  the second half of the 1990s
provides  ample  new  data to analyze  these  issues.  At this stage,  however,  the evidence
is simply not strong  enough  to draw  firm conclusions  regarding  the impact  of foreign
bank entry on the allocation  of credit, and the strength  and stability of the domestic
financial  system  . More  work--possibly  along  the lines of Goldberg,  Dages,  aId Kinney
(2000)--is  needed  before  broad  generalizations  can be made.
Another  issue  that was emphasized  in the paper  is the risk of sharp  reversals  in
short-term  capital  flows that may accompany  a high degree of financial openness.  If
international  capital  markets  are prone  to over-exuberance  in good times and excess
pessimism  or herding (leading  to sudden withdrawals  of capital) in bad times, the
benefits  of capital  inflows  can be completely  offset by large and sudden outflows  that
may put an already  weak domestic  financial  system  under stress.  In such conditions,
financial  integration  may increase  the risk  of costly  financial  crises,  instead  of reducing
them.  The empirical  evidence  reviewed  in the paper  suggests  indeed  that international
capital  markets  can be prone  to sharp  shifts in sentiment  regarding  a country's  short-
and longer-term  economic  prospects.  The  discipline  that they exercise  over government
policies,  although  beneficial  in  some respects,  can be excessive.
Nevertheless,  despite creating the possibility  of costly crises, global financial
integration  appears  to hold  significant  benefits  in terms  of economic  growth-particularly
when  the capital  inflows  that it leads  to take the form  of FDI.  These  "dynamic  gains"  are
magnified  in economies  where,  to begin  with,  the stock  of human  capital  is high  enough
to take advantage  of complementarity  effects  between  technology  and skills. The key
issue for  both national and  international  policymakers  is  therefore not to  choose
between  openness  and autarky,  but rather to design policies  that help minimize  the
short-term  risks, and maximize  the longer-run  gains, of financial  openness.  From  the
point of view of domestic  policymakers,  there has been renewed emphasis on the
importance  of macroeconomic  discipline,  information  disclosure,  and enhanced  banking
sector  supervision.  Avoiding  real exchange  rate  misalignment,  limiting  fiscal irnbalances
32and preventing  an excessive  buildup  of domestic  debt, maintaining  a monetary  policy
consistent  with low inflation,  and  ensuring  that  the ratio  of unhedged  short-term  foreign-
currency  debt  over  official  reserves  remains  sufficiently  low,  are all preventive  measures
that are likely  to reduce  the risk  that sudden  changes  in market  sentiment  may  turn into
large capital  oufflows  and precipitate  a financial  crisis. Strengthening  supervision  and
prudential  regulation,  and fostering risk management  capacities in banks and non-
financial  firms, are also important. 2'  The stronger economic fundamentals  are, the
longer  the track record of macroeconomic  discipline,  the less susceptible  the country
will be to potentially  volatile flows and thus the lower the probability  of a financial
crisis. 22
But unwarranted  changes  in expectations  can and  do occur,  even  when  underlying
economic fundamentals  appear strong. Opening the  capital account unavoidably
exposes  countries  to cycles  in capital  flows,  particularly  sharp  reversals  after  (or during)
crises. Openness also  increases vulnerability to  runs  on  the  financial system.
Concerns  include  maturity  or currency  mismatches,  fragility of the domestic  financial
system,  both  related  to excessive  risk-taking  encouraged  by a generous  (often  implicit)
safety net. Problems  of asymmetric  information  (essentially,  that recipients  of funds
know  more  about  their investments  than  do lenders)  are likely  to remain  pervasive.  The
strengthening  of the financial  system  (including  improved  supervision  and accounting
standards)  may  take a long  time in countries  where  technical  expertise  in government  is
limited.  During  the transition  to a more  efficient  financial  system,  distortions  in domestic
capital  markets  may continue  to exacerbate  the adverse  effects  of external  volatility.  For
all these reasons,  policymakers  may need to proceed  gradually  with capital account
liberalization,  or may have  to resort  during  transitory  periods  to additional  instruments,
such as restrictions  on short-term  capital flows, to prevent excessive  volatility  from
21 It should  be  emphasized  also  that  strengthening  bank  supervision  and  regulation  prior  to external
financial  liberalization  assumes  that domestic  banks  are, to begin  with, reasonably  healthy.  In countries
where domestic  banks are weak (in the sense  of having  low or negative  net worth), restructuring  or
merging  operations  may  be required  prior  to exposing  them  to foreign  competition.
2  Regional  cooperation  and integration  can be a significant  "stepping  stone"  in helping  countries
(particularly  the small  ones)  integrate  successfully  into  the  global  trade  and  financial  systems.  The pooling
of resources  that  the creation  of a regional  stock market  would  create,  for instance,  might  enhance  the
ability  of foreign  investors  to diversify  idiosyncratic  risks.
33adversely  affecting  domestic  stability.  Without  a doubt,  maintaining  the effectiveness  of
any type of restrictions  on capital  movements  beyond  the short term has proved  very
difficult  in practice  (see  Ariyoshi  et al. (2000),  and Kaminsky  and Schmukler  (2301)).  But
even as a transitory  device,  countries  may still need to consider  short-term  controls  on
capital  flows  as part  of their arsenal  of policy  instruments.
Finally,  it must be recognized  that fostering  financial integration  has important
implications  for reforming  the international  financial  system.  The world still lacks clear
rules  for dealing  with  financial  crises.  In particular,  there is neither  a lender  of last  resort,
nor effective  standstills  on unserviceable  debt. To stabilize  cross-border  capital  flows,
international  organizations  need  to find ways  to enhance  the confidence  of international
creditors  without  exacerbating  moral  hazard.
34Appendix  A
Determinants  of Foreign  Direct  Investment  to Small  States
This Appendix  discusses  some regression  results  that attempt to highlight  the
determinants  of FDI to small  states.  The  dependent  variable  is the ratio  of FDI  to GDP;
the  explanatory  variables  are
* the rate of growth  of real GDP, a proxy for the domestic  rate of return on
domestic  investments  and the country's  economy's  prospects;
*  the ratio of gross domestic  investment  in percent of GDP, to account for
possible  complementarities  between  domestic  and foreign investment,  a particularly
relevant  consideration  for FDI;
*  the  degree  of openness,  measured  by the ratio  of imports  and exports  to GDP,
which  accounts  for the fact that more open economies  tend to be more vulnerable  to
losing  access  to foreign  financing;
*  the  ratio  of total  debt  to GDP,  which  captures  the risk  of confiscation;
3  the real LIBOR  rate,  which  can be viewed  as a proxy  for the rate of return  on
foreign  assets;
*  real  GDP  per capita,  a proxy  for the level  of development;
*  the volatility  of the real  exchange  rate,  which  can be viewed  as a proxy  for the
degree  of macroeconomic  stability  (Bhattacharya,  Montiel,  and  Sharma  (1997)).
Table 1 presents  the regression  results  using pooled  time-series,  cross-section
data for 28 countries  covering the period 1980-98  (see Appendix B for the list of
countries,  a more detailed definition  of the variables  and a description  of the data
sources).  The  estimation  method  is instrumental  variables  with  fixed  effects.
The results  indicate  that real GDP  per capita  has a positive  effect on FDI flows in
almost  all regressions.  The real LIBOR  rate has no discernible  effect,  and neither  does
the stock of foreign debt or the ratio of domestic  investment  to output. The rate of
growth  of real GDP, as well as the degree  of openness,  have  both a highly  significant
impact  on FDI flows, although  the degree of significance  of the latter variable  drops
somewhat  when  the lagged  value  of FDI  to GDP  is added  as a regressor  to account  for
some  degree  of inertia  in these  flows.  Finally,  although  the volatility  of the real  exchange
rate  has  a negative  sign,  as expected,  it is not  significant.
35Appendix  B
Country  Names,  Variable  Definitions,  and Data  Sources
This Appendix  presents  the list of small  states included  in the regression  results
presented  in Table 2 and discussed  in Appendix  A, a more precise definition  of the
variables  used  in the regressions,  and  sources  of the data.
Countries
Countries  included  in the sample  are Barbados,  Belize,  Bhutan,  Botswana,  Cape
Verde,  Comoros,  Djibouti,  Dominica,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Estonia,  Fiji, Gabon,  Gambia,
Grenada, Guinea-Bissau,  Guyana, Maldives, Mauritius, Samoa, Sao  Tome and
Principe,  St. Kitts  and Nevis,  St. Lucia,  Solomon  Islands,  Seychelles,  Swaziland,  Tonga,
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  and Vanuatu.
Definition  and  source  of variables  used  in regressions
Foreign  Direct Investment  (FDI): Flow of net direct investment  in percent  of GDP.
Source:  Global  Development  Finance  (GDF,  2000  CD-ROM),  World Bank.
Real GDP Growth Rate (RGDPGR):  Growth rate of real GDP (in percent).  Source:
World  Development  Indicators  (WDI,  2000  CD-ROM),  World Bank.
Real  GDP  per  capita  (GDP-PC):  GDP  per capita  in real  terms.  Source:  WDI.
Gross Domestic  Fixed Investment  (GDFI): Gross domestic  fixed investment  as a
percent  of GDP.  Source:  WDI.
Openness  (OPEN): Ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP (in percent).
Source:  WDI.
Total  Debt  (TD):  Total  debt in percent  of GDP.  Source:  GDF.
Real LIBOR  (RLIBOR):  Difference  between  six-month  LIBOR  and the inflation  rate in
industrial  countries.  Source:  WDI and International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS).
Variability  of the real exchange rate (VREER): obtained by taking the standard
deviation  of the real effective  exchange  rate and averaging  over periods  t, t-1, and t-2.
Source:  IFS.
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41Table 1 Foreign  Bank  Ownership  in Selected  Emerging  Markets (in percent)'
Foreign  Control 2 Foreign  Control 2
December  1994  December  1999
Central  Europe
Czech  Republic  5.8  49.3
Hungary  19.8  56.6
Poland  2.1  52.8
Total  7.8  52.3
Turkey  2.7  1.7
Latin  America
Argentina  17.9  48.6
Brazil  8.4  16.8
Chile  16.3  53.6
Colombia  6.2  17.8
Mexico  1.0  18.8
Peru  6.7  33.4
Venezuela  0.3  41.9
Total  7.5  25.0
Total  excluding  Brazil
and Mexico  13.1  44.8
Asia
Korea  0.8  4.3
Malaysia  6.8  11.5
Thailand  0.5  5.6
Total  1-6  63.0
Source: IMF,  World Capital Markets  Report 2000 (p.153).
1 Ownership  data reflect  changes  up  to December 1999 while balance  sheet data are the  most recent available in
Fitch IBCA's BankScope.
2Ratio  of assets of banks  where foreigners own more than 50 percent of total equity  to total bank assets.Table 2
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Small States, 1980-98
(Instrumental Variable Method with Fixed Effects)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
FDI(-l)  0.5184  0.4826  0.5200  0.4885
(10.7100)  (10.7705)  (10.7401)  (10,8940)
RGDPGR  0.0608  0.0470  0.0405  0.0332  0.0432  0.0396  0.0448  0.0297
(2.3355)  (2.6227)  (1.6291)  (2.0802)  (2.1597)  (2.8942)  (2.3084)  (2.4558)
GDFI  0.0070
(0.3636)
OPEN  0.0169  0.0292  0.0370  0.0275  0.0101  0.0083  0.0064  0.0067
(1.6710)  (4.4029)  (4.7078)  (4.5950)  (1.5299)  (1.6308)  (1.3050)  (1.6107)
TD  -0.0009  0.0002  -0.0017  -0.0002  0.0003
(-0.3782)  (0.1270)  (-0.6969)  (-0.1214)  (0.1780)
RLIBOR  -0.0728
(-1.1211)
GDP-PC  0.0002  0.0002  0.0001  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
(2.2839)  (2.5790)  (2.0159)  (3.2578)  (1.0929)  (1.5328)  (1.2076)  (1.6309)
VREER  -0.1092  -0.1475  -0.2542  -0.1889
(-0.3054)  (-0.4924)  (-1.0031)  (-0.8439)
Adj. R2  0.5999  0.5352  0.5758  0.5435  0.7046  0.6655  0.7055  0.6811
Total panel  276  380  296  382  296  380  296  380
Observations
Standarderrorof  2.9212  3.0457  3.3003  3.1798  3.0452  2.8486  3.0681  2.8945
regression
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses. Foreign  Direct Investment  is the flow of net foreign  direct investment in  percent of GDP. RGDPGR  is the growth
rate of real GDP in percent. GDFI is the gross domestic  fixed investment  in percent of GDP. OPEN is the openness  index. TD is total debt in percent
of GDP. RLIBOR  is the real LIBOR. GDP_PC  is the real GDP per capita. VREER  is the variation  of the real effective  exchange  rate. The countries
are Barbados,  Belize, Bhutan, Botswana,  Cape Verde,  Comoros,  Djibouti, Dominica,  Equatorial  Guinea, Estonia,  Fiji, Gabon, Gambia,  Grenada,
Guinea-Bissau,  Guyana,  Maldives,  Mauritius,  Samoa,  Sao Tome and Principe,  St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Solomon  Islands, Seychelles,  Swaziland,
Tonga,  Trinidad and Tobago, Vanuatu.Figure  1
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Source-.  World  Bank,  Global  Development  Finance  (CD-Rom  2000).
1/  Private  net resource  flows  are  defined  as the sum  of net  flows  on debt  to private  creditors  plus  net  direct  foreign  investment
and  portfolio  equity  flows.  Net  flows  are  disbursements  minus  principal  repayments.
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Source:  World  Bank,  Global  Development  Finance  (CD-Rom  2000).
I/ Private  net resource  flows  are  defined  as  the sum  of  net flows  on debt  to private  creditors  plus  net  direct  foreign  investment
and  portfolio  equity  flows.  Net  flows  are  disbursements  minus  principal  repayments.
46Figure 2 (continued)
Small States: Private Net Resource Flows, 1980-98 1/
(In percent  of GNP)
15  -
10  Gambia  Grenada
10
0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
-4  - ,,,  '''5l,  0
1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998  1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998














1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998  1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998
Source:  World  Bank,  Global  Development  Finance  (CD-Rom  2000).
1/  Private  net resource  flows  are  defined  as the  sum  of net  flows  on debt  to private  creditors  plus  net direct  foreign  investment
and  portfolio  equity  flows.  Net  flows  are  disbursements  minus  principal  repayments.
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1/  Private  net resource  flows  are  defined  as the  sum  of net  flows  on debt  to private  creditors  plus  net  direct  foreign  investment
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Source:  World  Bank,  Global  Development  Finance  (CD-Rom  2000).
1/  Private  net  resource  flows  are  defined  as  the sum  of  net flows  on debt  to private  creditors  plus  net  direct  foreign  investment
and  portfolio  equity  flows.  Net  flows  are  disbursements  minus  principal  repayments.
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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance (CD-Rom 2000).
I/ Private net resource flows are defined as the sum of net flows on debt to private creditors plus net direct foreign investment
and portfolio equity flows. Net flows are disbursements  minus principal  repayments.
51Figure  2 (continued)
Small  States:  Private  Net  Resource  Flows,  1980-98  1/
(In percent  of GNP)
Total  private  net  resource  flows  r1  Foreign  Direct  Investment
15




0  o 
-4  -5











1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998  1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998
10 - 20
Maldives  15 . Mauritius
15
5  10
1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998  1980  1983  1986  1989  1992  1995  1998
Source:  World  Bank,  Global  Development  Finance  (CD-Rom  2000).
1/  Private  net  resource  flows  are  defined  as  the  sum  of  net  flows  on  debt  to  private  creditors  plus  net  direct  foreign  investment
and  portfolio  equity  flows.  Net  flows  are  disbursements  minus  principal  repayments.
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I/ Private net resource flows are defined as the sum'  of net flows on debt to private creditors plus net direct foreign investment
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1/  Private  net  resource  flows  are  defined  as  the sum  of net  flows  on debt  to private  creditors  plus  net  direct  foreign  investment
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Small  States:  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Gross  Domestic  Fixed  Investment,  1980-98
(in percent  of GDP)
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56Figure 5
Overhead  Costs  of Domestic  Banks  vs. Foreign  Banks,  1991-2000
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58Figure 7
Net  Interest  Margin  of Domestic  Banks  vs. Foreign  Banks,  1991-2000
(in percent  of total  assets)
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59Figure 8
Overhead  Costs  of Domestic  Banks  and Share  of Foreign  Banks,  1991-2000
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60Figure 9
Net  Income  of Domestic  Banks  and  Share  of Foreign  Banks,  1991-2000
(in percent  of total assets)
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61Figure 10
Net Interest  Margin  of Domestic  Banks  and Share  of Foreign  Banks,  1991-2000
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